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CONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CANON: THE METONYMIC EVOLUTION OF
FEDERALIST 10
Ian Bartrum*
What is the connection between what I have called languages,
functions from strings of sounds or marks to sets of possible
worlds, semantic systems discussed in complete abstraction
from human affairs, and what I have called language, a form of
rational, convention-governed human social activity?

David Lewis

1

David Lewis’s question about the connection between
“semantics” and “language-as-practiced” is, I think, analogous to
the question at the center of this discussion, which is: how are we
to understand the connection between constitutional text and
2
constitutional meaning? Recent and important work by Keith
* Assistant Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. I am grateful to the
members of this symposium for their thoughts and contributions to this piece. I also want
to thank Akhil Amar, Bruce Ackerman, Philip Bobbitt, Jules Coleman, Robert Fogelin,
Heidi Kitrosser, Mark Kende, Timothy Knepper, Anthony Kronman, Sanford Levinson,
the members of the Drake Law School Faculty Workshop, and participants in the Drake
University Humanities Colloquium for their generous help along the way. Finally, I want
to acknowledge Steven Gey, for whom the call for papers that generated this project is
named. Though I do not know Professor Gey personally, I know and respect his work—
and I am aware that he is beloved by generations of his students—and so I am deeply
honored.
1. David Lewis, Languages and Language, in 1 DAVID LEWIS: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 163, 166 (1983).
2. I should note at the outset that I do not use the word “meaning” in the strict
and narrow sense that Larry Solum intends in his Semantic Originalism. See Lawrence
Solum, Semantic Originalism 2–4 (Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. While, as Solum notes, this may cause
some confusion, I do not think his distinction between “semantic,” “applicative,” and
“teleological,” meanings is helpful, largely because I reject the Gricean conception of
“speaker’s meaning.” Meaning is always a shared or collective notion—in the sense that
no assertion has meaning apart from how it is understood (Kripke, notwithstanding,
there are no private languages)—no matter what a speaker intended. And, while there
may be such a thing as “speaker’s intent,” we cannot hope to get at it without looking to
the purposes and applications of an utterance, which is always a constructive enterprise.
For these reasons, I also reject the thesis that there are “linguistic facts,” in the sense that
Solum uses that phrase—at least in the cases of vague language that are of real

9
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Whittington and Lawrence Solum approached this question by
positing a fundamental distinction between the processes of
3
“interpretation” and “construction” in our legal practices. Put in
these terms, the question resounds with echoes of a much older
structural debate about the role of the judiciary in constitutional
government, and seems to hint that such a distinction, if real,
might help us identify the boundaries of legitimate judging. As a
dedicated puzzle-solver within Philip Bobbitt’s modal paradigm
4
of constitutional theory and discourse, however, I cannot take
the hint as offered because I do not believe that the legitimacy of
a constitutional practice rests upon externally imposed
foundational or normative theories—theories that seem to
suggest that there could be one correct kind of connection
between Lewis’s categories of “languages” and “language.”
Instead, I believe that legitimacy in constitutional practice arises
when we follow certain organic, internally generated
argumentative rules closely enough that other practitioners can
recognize and comprehend—if not always endorse—our
assertions of constitutional meaning. This is not to say that I am
insensitive to the attractions—the allure of objectivity and
constraint—that normative theories present. Nor do I doubt that
the interpretation-construction distinction can be an important
part of a precise species of historical arguments about
constitutional meaning in a limited class of cases. The point,
rather, is that I do not believe that, in general, these kinds of
objectivity and precision are definitive or limiting features of our
argumentative practices—those social processes by which we
currently decide upon constitutional meanings. But, I hasten to
add, I do not accept that this final assertion relegates me to the

constitutional concern. In all likelihood, my disagreement on these fundamental premises
explains why I doubt the ultimate utility of the interpretation-construction distinction.
3. See generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Solum, supra
note 2.
4. The not-so-clever reference is to Thomas Kuhn’s distinction between
revolutionary “paradigm shifts” and “normal science” puzzle-solving. See THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–12 (3d. ed. 1996). For the
paradigm shift, see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982) (outlining a practice-based grammar of constitutional discourse
grounded in six modalities of argument). For my attempts at puzzle-solving, see generally
Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 327 (2009) [hereinafter Bartrum, Constitutional Canon]; Ian Bartrum,
Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 157 (2008) [hereinafter Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities]; Ian
Bartrum, The Constitutional Structure of Disestablishment, 2 N.Y.U J.L. & LIBERTY 311
(2007).
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margins of contemporary theory, where I might commiserate
with the legal realists about the vagaries of an unconstrained
judiciary. To explain why, I must begin by briefly outlining the
Wittgensteinian underpinnings of Bobbitt’s modal theory.
One of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s fundamental purposes in the
Philosophical Investigations was to reject the search for a unified
account of language’s internal logic, which had occupied the bulk
5
of his only published work: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Rather, the later Wittgenstein suggested that language is not one
activity, but a variety of different kinds of activities, each with
6
different rules and purposes. Across the spectrum of these
myriad “language-games,” the same word often serves a variety
of different—though related—functions, each specific to the
7
particular “game” within which it is employed. From this it
follows that a word’s meaning often does not derive from some
foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is determined by
the use to which it is properly put within a particular language8
game. The properly part is critical, for it precludes the
impossible suggestion that a word can mean whatever we want
to use it to mean, and, instead, grounds the generalized claim
that “the meaning of a word is its use” in a more specific account
of what it is to understand and follow the rules of a language9
game. Without getting too deeply into Wittgenstein’s complex
and controverted theory of how we identify, understand, and
follow these rules, it is essential to remember that obeying a rule
is also a social practice and “[h]ence it is not possible to obey a
10
rule privately.” We can only know that we have successfully
followed a rule—that we know how to use a word and thus what
it means—when our usage is understood, or “ratified,” by
11
another participant in the particular language-game. But, as
5. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11–12 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS]. Here
Wittgenstein introduces the concept of a varied “multiplicity of language-games” as an
objection to “what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the
author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)” Id. (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974)) .
For a very helpful introduction to these ideas, see ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN
107–30 (2d ed. 1987); A.C. GRAYLING, WITTGENSTEIN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
81–89 (1996).
6. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 11–12, 13, 31.
7. Id. at 31–35. Wittgenstein famously likened this “relation” to a “family
resemblance.” Id. at 32.
8. Id. at 20.
9. Id. at 20, 79–81; accord GRAYLING, supra note 5, at 86.
10. Id. at 81.
11. For a discussion of “ratification” in this context, see PETER WINCH, THE IDEA
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elements of a practice, the rules themselves will evolve as
contexts and purposes change, and as individual participants
leave their impact on the game. It is in something like this way
12
that meanings change over time.
Bobbitt’s modal theory thoughtfully applies some of these
insights about the nature of language to the contextualized social
practice that concerns us here: constitutional law. He has
suggested that we should understand the Constitution itself as
analogous to a Wittgensteinian language-game—complete with
its own internal rules or grammar—and thus the legitimacy of a
constitutional assertion depends upon its grounding in the
13
proper forms of argument and usage. For Bobbitt, six such
argumentative forms or modalities—textual, historical,
structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical—make up the
14
To be clear, an assertion of
constitutional grammar.
constitutional meaning rooted in one or more of these modalities
is legitimate, but not necessarily dispositive. It is up to the courts,
the decision-makers in our practice, to choose among competing
assertions at any given moment in time. And even a judicial
decision may be only an impermanent resolution of
constitutional meaning. After all, an ill-fitting decision—like an
inapt word or metaphor in any language-game—may protrude,
exposed, into the unforgiving flow of practice, and, if not
15
formally revisited, simply wear away over time. On the
contrary, other assertions of meaning—some judicially
recognized, and some not—may settle so comfortably into our
practice that they become seemingly imperturbable bulwarks of
the growing constitutional edifice. And so, in this way, I suggest
that we are all, as participants in the constitutional conversation,
constantly constructing constitutional meaning—even when we
are simply “interpreting” the text. But our construction is not
OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY

36–39 (1st ed. 1958).
12. I concede that these last two sentences are probably an extrapolation of
Wittgenstein’s comments, though I think they are justified. For some related thoughts,
see FOGELIN, supra note 5, at 121–22; Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities, supra note 4,
at 188–89.
13. I think it is important to emphasize here that Bobbitt sees the relationship
between constitutional practices and language practices as analogous. He does not
contend that constitutional law is a language-game, or that it is, in some sense, its own
language; rather the claim is that there are important similarities between the ways that
we argue about (and thus understand) constitutional meanings and Wittgenstein’s usagebased account of linguistic meaning.
14. For a more detailed account, see BOBBITT, supra note 4; accord PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
15. I take the central holding of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), to
be an excellent example of this phenomenon.
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unconstrained in a coarse realist sense. Instead, we are guided ex
ante by the rules of constitutional grammar, and we are
answerable ex post to a faceless and proletarian norm-giver: the
16
practice.
From this perspective, I think we must reorient the
discussion of interpretation and construction so that we no
longer view the distinction linearly, as if it separated an initial
analytic or foundational kind of inquiry (interpretation) from a
subsequent synthetic or derivational kind of activity
(construction). Instead, we should treat both activities—if we
assume that they are, in fact, distinct in some interesting way—as
interrelated and interdependent aspects of an ongoing effort to
overcome the fundamental and inherently problematic
17
relationship between linguistic vagueness and the law. More
importantly, I do not believe either activity can actually reveal
something a priori or foundational. Professor Solum’s
16. I do not mean to suggest here that we can derive a substantial kind of an
“ought” from an “is” by looking to argumentative practice for guidance. See DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton
eds., 2000). Rather, the effort is to describe the grammatical rules that allow us to make
legitimate assertions of the “ought.” I do concede that the idea of deriving ex post
normative judgments from the long-term assimilations of practice may seem to blur the
line between Hume’s categories, but I do not intend the term “normative” here as an
assessment of “ought” in any thick sense. I simply contend that these assimilations
establish the norms governing successful communication within the practice as it “is.” In
this sense, then, I merely present an instance of Arthur Prior’s functionalist
counterexample to Hume’s assertion: “From the premise ‘He is a sea-captain’ the
conclusion may validly be inferred that ‘He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to
do.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 57 (2d. ed. 1984); accord Paul Bloomfield,
Prescriptions Are Assertions: An Essay on Moral Syntax, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 17 n.14
(1998).
17. My intuition is that some exploration of the venerable and diverse literature
within the philosophy of language on the problem of vagueness may be helpful to this
debate. See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, Vagueness, 1 AUSTRALASIAN J. OF PSYCHOL. & PHIL.
84 (1923) (giving an introductory overview of the problem); TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,
VAGUENESS (1994) (surveying the subject). Consider, for example, David Lewis’s
assessment of the complications that the vague kinds of language often used in ordinary
conversation can present to the semantic logician:
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no
determinate truth-value. Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line.
Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary
between bald and not-bald, the sentence is true. Relative to other delineations,
no less reasonable, it is false. Nothing in our use of language makes one of these
delineations right and all others wrong. We cannot pick a delineation once and
for all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider the
entire range of reasonable delineations.
David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in 1 DAVID LEWIS: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 233, 244 (1983). These difficulties are, I think, only compounded when speakers
use vague language deliberately, which certainly seems to be true of some aspects of
constitution framing.
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sophisticated argument notwithstanding, in most cases I do not
think that an assertion’s “semantic content” can be understood
18
in terms of “linguistic facts”; rather, meaning arises when both
a speaker and a hearer identify and follow the applicable
language conventions—which are, in turn, constructed through
conversation over time. And so, in constitutional discourse, I
think it is more accurate to say that today’s “constructions” (and
their assimilation over time) will necessarily reshape and
reconstitute the conventions—the Wittgensteinian rules—that
19
govern tomorrow’s “interpretation.” This means that the words
alone are often not resource enough to ground a definitive act of
interpretation; we must also know a great deal about the
constructed conventional context in which they were written if
20
we hope to give an authentic account of speaker’s intent. And,
once we are beyond the words themselves, it seems to me that
we are taking the first few steps across the border between
21
interpretation and construction. In this sense, then, a
meaningful act of interpretation is, itself, constructive in ways
that tend to undermine the distinction’s utility as a constraint on
judges (although, again, the distinction may highlight other
interesting features of adjudication).

18. Perhaps the most revealing statement of this position appears in Lawrence
Solum’s A Reader’s Guide To Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin:
“When we disagree about [semantic content] we are disagreeing about linguistic facts. In
principle, there is a fact of the matter about what linguistic content is.” Lawrence Solum,
A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 13 (Illinois
Public Law Research Paper, Paper No. 08-12, 2008) available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1130665. I simply disagree on this point: quite often language—particularly
vague language—does not refer us to some factual content; instead, it asks us to identify
and employ certain communicative conventions. Thus, “linguistic rules,” not “linguistic
facts,” are generally at the heart of our disagreements over meaning.
19. I take this to be a roughly Quineian kind of point. See W.V.O. Quine, Two
Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20, 20–31 (1951) (demonstrating analyticity’s
question-begging reliance on synonymy).
20. This much I take to be entirely consistent with Grice’s account of meaning—
particularly his work on implicature. See H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan eds., 1975).
Here I think Solum would agree. See Solum, supra note 18, at 12 (discussing
constitutional implicature).
21. I recognize that proponents intend the distinction to separate our efforts to
determine “speaker’s intent” (interpretation) from our efforts to create congruous legal
rules (construction), and thus would likely argue that any constructive efforts to recover
speaker’s intent rightly remain on the “interpretation” side of the divide. I would point
out, however, that—in the constitutional context—some of the kinds of things we might
consider once we get “beyond the words” include considerations such as “the speaker
cannot have meant X because that seems to require absurd legal rule Y.” This kind of
(perhaps inevitable?) argument seems to seriously muddy the interpretation-construction
waters seriously.
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I suppose that interpretation-construction proponents might
argue that we do not need a fully determinative theory of
original textual meaning to make the distinction a useful part of
an originalist theory of constitutional meaning—and they could
be right. In other words, as long as we can roughly agree on what
competent speakers understood constitutional language to mean
at the time it was ratified, then we have something relatively
foundational on which to construct the legal rules applicable to
modern controversies. (In Bobbitt’s terms, we might use
historical argument to ground our doctrinalism). The larger
point, however, is that our constitutional practices are analogous
enough to our language practices that the same contextual
variables which complicate theories of textual “interpretation”
also complicate (perhaps to an even greater extent) the
argumentative practices through which we “construct” legal
rules. To be competent, or at least understood, within the
practice, we must embed our assertions of constitutional
meaning within the argumentative context that we inherit and
inhabit—and original intentions are only one part of that larger
context. And so, unfortunately, I think something is lost from
the project the interpretation-distinction was supposed to help
make possible: it can only rarely help define the connection
between constitutional text and constitutional meaning; for the
most part, it just gives us more precise means of deriving a
possible connection. Ultimately, then, the distinction itself—
inasmuch as it helps make up an originalist theory—falls fairly
squarely into the “construction” category. It is a tool we can use
to help build the doctrine that (at least temporarily) bridges the
gap between text and meaning. But it is just one of many that we
might add to our practice and its norms—one which may or may
not help to make up the context within which we understand
future constitutional arguments or assertions.
All of this is perhaps a roundabout way of saying, in a
Bobbitt-inspired accent, that constitutional text is not the only—
nor often even a particularly helpful or determinative—source of
constitutional meaning. On most occasions, indeed, in almost all
the controversial cases, the text is barely even a starting point for
a much broader argument in which we make assertions of
history, structure, doctrine, prudence, and constitutional ethos.
And it is this grammar, this evolving body of organically
constructed rules and conventions, which establishes the
boundaries of reasonable interpretation—not, as the
interpretation-construction distinction seems to suggest, some
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set of foundational “facts” about speaker’s meaning. Only in the
most basic and uncontroversial cases, then, can we usefully
describe the practice of connecting constitutional text with
constitutional meaning as a two-step process, in which we
establish an objective referent and then build out applicable
legal rules. Rather, in the cases of most concern, we must both
recognize and creatively employ the existing argumentative
conventions to establish the boundaries of acceptable
interpretation (this, itself, is constructive) and then make our
assertions of constitutional meaning (construct legal rules)
within the confines of the interpretive framework we have
helped build. At every step along the way, then, making a
successful assertion of constitutional meaning is much more an
art than the science that the interpretation-construction
distinction would suggest.
In the remainder of this Essay I hope to illustrate one
particularly powerful way that we can—through our very acts of
argument—exert evolutionary pressure on the conventions and
grammar that define legitimate constitutional argument. By
creatively using, and thus slightly redefining, certain “canonical”
constitutional texts, we can give new contours to the
conventional context that establishes the boundaries of
reasonable interpretive choice. These texts, which seem to
resound so powerfully in our constitutional ear that they have
hardened into part of the fundamental law, itself, both shape and
are shaped by legitimate constitutional argument. In this way,
the canon is reminiscent of another of Wittgenstein’s enduring
aphorisms, in which he analogizes our knowledge of the world to
a river and its banks:
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as
channels for such empirical propositions as were not
hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in
that fluid propositions became hardened, and hard ones
22
became fluid.

Wittgenstein’s metaphor is, I think, a very helpful way to
visualize the relationship between the constitutional canon and
constitutional practice. Canonical texts help to form the
riverbanks through which our everyday arguments and practice
must flow like water. But, while a competent constitutional
22. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 15 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
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practitioner must remain within the canonical riverbed when
constructing modal arguments, she may in turn—through
perhaps subtle alterations in usage—reshape the constitutional
23
geology over time. Importantly, this is not to suggest, as the
realist might, that a canonical text can mean whatever one wants
it to mean at any particular place and time. The practitioner still
must use the text properly: she must follow the rules, and her
usages must be understood and ratified within the relevant
community, for her to make any legitimate assertion of
constitutional meaning. The contention is rather that, as creative
individual actors within a much larger creative practice, we can
impact and grow the grammatical conventions governing
constitutional argument over time, thus changing the ways that
canonical texts are appropriately used and understood.
In the longer work from which this Essay derives, I
explored, in depth, three examples of canonical (or
24
anticanonical) evolution in our practice. There I argued that
canonical texts normally function as metonyms within the
constitutional conversation: that is, we typically invoke them not
to refer to their literal terms, but rather as shorthand for a larger
25
set of associated ideas or principles. This metonymic
conception, I suggest, makes these texts particularly susceptible
to the kinds of creative usage that may lead to evolutions in
meaning over time. The three examples I chose to explore—
Thomas Jefferson’s Reply to the Danbury Baptists, Lochner v.
New York, and the Declaration of Independence—were meant
to illustrate three distinct kinds of metonymic evolution, each
accomplished within a different sphere of constitutional
discourse. Further, I tried to identify each text’s “modal home,”
or the argumentative modality within which it most often and
comfortably appears. Thus, Jefferson’s letter derives from the
historical modality, and is meant to illustrate a process of
decanonization accomplished within the sphere of judging.
Lochner, by contrast, emerges from doctrinal argument and
exemplifies canonical refinement realized in the sphere of legal
scholarship. The Declaration of Independence is at home in

23. To return to the reference with which I began, this relationship is not unlike
that Thomas Kuhn describes between “paradigms” and “normal science.” See KUHN,
supra note 4, at 10–12.
24. I explored many of these ideas in Bartrum, Constitutional Canon, supra note 4,
at 311–90; some of the material herein appeared there first.
25. Id. at 329.
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ethical argument and demonstrates canonical reformation within
the sphere of constitutional politics.
In this Essay, I explore the argumentative use and evolution
of a fourth canonical illustration, James Madison’s Federalist 10.
This text does not seem to fit quite as neatly into my earlier
taxonomies, but this, perhaps, makes it all the more interesting
as an example. I suggest that Federalist 10 has two modal homes
in our practice—both in the historical and structural forms—and
that at least part of its metonymic evolution has been to shift
slightly from one home to another. As part of this process, the
text has undergone two distinct phases of evolution, both
occurring within the academic sphere of constitutional discourse.
The first phase is one of canonization in the work of Charles
26
Beard and his followers. The second phase—that of canonical
refinement—occurred in the second half of last century,
beginning with the work of Douglass Adair and concluding with
27
Larry Kramer’s more recent revisions. In what follows, I trace
the broad contours of these evolutions in metonymic meaning
through the academic discourse and conclude with a brief
examination of the impacts these changes had on constitutional
argument, as practiced in the courts. In so doing, I hope to
illustrate one of the ways that, over time, our arguments
themselves shape the grammatical context that, in turn, defines
the limits of reasonable interpretation and argumentation.
HISTORY AND STRUCTURE: FEDERALIST 10 AND
CANONICAL REFINEMENT
James Madison’s Federalist 10 is likely among the first
primary texts of constitutional theory the modern American high
school student encounters, and, if her experience is anything like
my own, it is presented as emblematic of the Founders’
structural insight into the moderating virtues of a pluralistic
democracy. Framed this way, the text has powerful metonymic
resonance in two distinct modalities of constitutional argument.
First, it is used the make the structural assertion that an extended
republic governed by multiple overlapping sovereigns provides
26. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (Macmillan Co. 1913).
27. DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN
DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER
(Mark E. Yellin ed., 2000) [hereinafter ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS]; Douglass
Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48 (1951) [hereinafter Adair,
Revisited]; Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999).
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the best institutional protection against the destructive
tendencies of political faction. Second, it is presented as
evidence for the historical argument that the Framers and
ratifiers endorsed this theory in the late 1780s, and that,
wherever possible, we should endeavor to promote pluralism as
an originalist constitutional maxim. But, in truth, Federalist 10
has not always stood resolutely for these principles in our
practice—indeed, for over a hundred years, the text had virtually
no place at all in the discourse—and its future viability, at least
as a historical metonym, is now in some doubt. Thus, as with
many other canonical texts, Federalist 10’s meaning in
constitutional argument continues to evolve, and, as it does, so
do the boundaries of reasonable constitutional interpretation. I
begin my description by attempting to locate Madison’s essay in
its original historical context.
The story of Federalist 10 begins in the late months of 1786,
as Madison began to make preparations for the momentous
convention to be held the following spring in Philadelphia. In the
years following the British surrender at Yorktown, America’s
leading statesmen contemplated the evolving political situation
28
in the states with growing alarm. Their concerns were myriad,
to be sure, but they fell into three general categories. First, there
was a splintering of state political communities into increasingly
strident groups or factions—at least partly the product of an
empowering revolutionary ethos—which led to an explosion of
conventioneering, and, in extreme cases, the kind of mobbery
that would lead to outbreaks like Shays’ Rebellion in western
29
Massachusetts. Second, and perhaps more troubling, were
emerging abuses of the legislative power itself, as cabals in the
state legislature (most notably Rhode Island) began to push
through a smothering multitude of so-called “tender” and
“paper money” laws intended to dilute the value of outstanding
30
financial obligations. Third, there was the problem of interstate
rivalry, as the spirit of state power and independence threatened
to bloom into the kind of protectionism that might strangle
commerce and doom the new American economy to perpetual
31
debt. It was on the pretext of solving this final problem that

28. For an excellent discussion of this period, see generally GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 393–430 (2d ed. 1998).
29. Id. at 396–403.
30. Id. at 403–08. On Rhode Island, see GEORGE TINDALL & DAVID SHI,
AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 297–98 (4th ed. 1996).
31. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224–27 (2004).
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delegates from Virginia and Maryland accepted George
Washington’s invitation to meet at Mt. Vernon in 1785, out of
which caucus emerged an invitation to all thirteen states to send
representatives to a larger convention in Annapolis in
32
September of 1786. When only five states showed up in
Maryland, Alexander Hamilton—a staunch proponent of
constitutional reform—seized the opportunity to propose a third
33
convention the following spring in Philadelphia, this time fully
empowered “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to
them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal
34
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”
Like Hamilton, Madison hoped to radically overhaul the
Articles of Confederation, and he departed Annapolis
determined to put together a comprehensive plan for
constitutional reform. Earlier that year, with the aid of a
“literary cargo” Thomas Jefferson had sent from Paris, he had
begun an extensive study of previous attempts at republican
35
government. Leaving Annapolis, however, Madison abandoned
his historical project—apparently satisfied that the destructive
tendencies of political faction had crippled all earlier republican
efforts—and undertook an introspective examination of the
36
American system. Somewhere in these investigations, most
likely amidst the crates from France, it seems that he ran into the
political musings of David Hume; in particular the Scotsman’s
suggestion that it might be possible to establish an extended
37
republic over a large area. This, for Madison, was a welcome—
32. TINDALL & SHI, supra note 30, at 300. On commerce issues as pretext for more
radical designs, see WOOD, supra note 28, at 473 (“Both trade conventions of the
previous two years, at Mt. Vernon and Annapolis, were but devices to be used in the
move to change the central government.”).
33. WOOD, supra note 28, at 473.
34. Alexander Hamilton, Address of the Annapolis Convention: 1786, in 1 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 335, 339 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (emphasis
omitted).
35. Kramer, supra note 27, at 626. For the fruit of this labor, see James Madison, Of
Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369–90 (G.P.
Putnam & Sons, 1900).
36. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 35, at 361.
37. It was Douglass Adair—whose contributions to this story unfold below—that
first brought attention to Madison’s reliance on Hume’s work. See Douglass Adair, “That
Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth
Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON’S LIBRARY Q. 343 (1957). But see Edmund S. Morgan, Safety
in Numbers: Madison, Hume, and the Tenth Federalist, 49 HUNTINGTON’S LIBR. Q. 95
(1986) (questioning Madison’s reliance on Hume). For Hume’s thoughts on the virtues of
an extended republic, see David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in HUME:
POLITICAL ESSAYS 221, 221–33 (Knud Haakonsen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994)
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though perhaps startling—thought. The accepted wisdom, best
expressed by Montesquieu, was that successful democratic
governance was possible only over a small, relatively
homogeneous republic; and this adage often formed the
centerpiece of provincial objections to a strong centralized
38
government. For Madison, then, Hume’s suggestion was a
paradigm shift, and he gladly undertook an exploration of the
39
possible political benefits an extended republic might present.
Even during his intense study and preparation, Madison
continued to work the political wheel in an effort to ensure the
40
success of the upcoming convention. In particular, he pressed
Washington, whom he knew to be sympathetic to the reform
41
effort, to both endorse and attend the meeting. Madison well
knew that the General’s immense national prestige would lend
badly needed credibility to the endeavor, and would likely assure
the attendance of those states that had forgone the Annapolis
42
meeting. He also kept in constant communication with
Jefferson in Paris, advising him of the developments leading up
to Philadelphia. He sent his fellow Virginians at least twelve
letters in late 1786 and 1787, and, as the anticipated convention
drew near, he began to share glimpses of his emerging theory of
43
faction in the extended republic. On April 16, 1787—with
Washington’s endorsement safely promised—Madison revealed
his recent thoughts to the General in arguing that the national
government should have authority to veto all state laws:
[A] negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of
the States . . .appears to me to absolutely necessary, and to be
the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. . . .
[A] happy effect of this prerogative would be its controul on
the internal vicissitudes of State policy, and the aggressions of

(1754). Many also see the roots of Madison’s argument in Book VII of Aristotle’s
Politics. See, e.g., Peter Simpson, Aristotle’s Regime of the Americans, in ARISTOTLE’S
POLITICS TODAY 109, 109–27 (Lenn E. Goodman & Robert B. Talisse eds., 2007); Ralph
L. Ketcham, Notes on James Madison’s Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper, 1
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 20, 21 (1957).
38. See CHARLES DI MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS BK. VIII 124 (Anne
Cohler, et. al eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (“It is in the nature of a republic
to have only a small territory . . .”).
39. Madison, supra note 36, at 366.
40. JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE
FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 39 (2007).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Madison, supra note 35, at 229–374.

!!!BARTRUM-271-CONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANONFINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:52 AM

22

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 27:9

interested majorities on the rights of minorities and of
44
individuals.

Here is the germ of Madison’s theoretical addition to Hume’s
thoughts: the peculiar advantage of an extended republic was the
likelihood that an enlarged, and thus diversified, national
legislature would temper the dangers of localized faction with
the alloy of political pluralism.
Just a month before journeying to Philadelphia, Madison
outlined a more complete version of his new theory in notes he
prepared in anticipation of the convention. In the final section,
entitled “Injustice of the Laws of the States,” he further
explained his counterintuitive notion:
If an enlargement of the [republican] sphere is found to lessen
the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of
common interest or passion is less predominant in this case
with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is
apt to be felt and the combinations less easy to be formed by a
great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken
into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passion, which
check each other, whilst those who may feel a common
sentiment have less opportunity of communication and
concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular
States contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not
to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits. . . . As a
limited monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an
extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small
45
Republic.

It was in this way, then, that Madison believed he could turn one
of the principal objections to a nationalized republic back
against itself: rather than a great problem, enlarging the scope of
democratic government was, in fact, a great solution. Through
his studies, Madison came to believe that it was faction itself that
presented the most fundamental threat to ordered liberty, and
thus it was the control of faction that must be government’s
46
central purpose. To this end, he began to put together a
proposal that would radically restructure the central government
in ways designed to implement his new theory of the extended

44. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted
in Madison, supra note 35, at 344, 346.
45. Madison, supra note 36, at 368.
46. See id.
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republic, a proposal that Edmund Randolph would present in
47
late May to the Philadelphia delegates as the Virginia Plan.
While many of the delegates undoubtedly believed they
were assembled solely to address the deficiencies of the existing
national government, Madison had come to believe that it was
equally important for the convention to devise a plan capable of
protecting “republican liberty” from “the abuses of it practiced
48
in some of the states.” This was precisely what he believed an
extended republic could accomplish—self-interested minorities
that might succeed in disrupting state government would be
drowned in the relative ocean of national politics—and it was for
this reason that he saw a national veto over all state laws as
49
imperative. Indeed, when Randolph and other delegates left
the topic of state vicissitudes out of the early discussions,
Madison rose to object and took the opportunity to give full
voice to his new ideas. According to his own notes, he gave the
following account of his recent thoughts:
[Roger Sherman] had admitted that in a very small State,
faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be inferred then
that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. . . . The
only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the
community into so great a number of interests & parties, that
in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same
moment to have a common interest separate from that of the
whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in the case
they shd. have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite
50
in the pursuit of it.

This speech marked the debut of Madison’s new theory among
his contemporary statesmen, and—as discussed below—it is not
at all clear than anyone other than Hamilton fully understood
51
it. What is clear, however, is that the convention would
eventually reject his call for an absolute national veto over state
laws, which he saw as an essential mechanism of the faction52
suppressing extended republic. Even so, just four months later
47. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 20-–23 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1911).
48. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 130, 134.
49. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 44, at 346.
50. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 130, 134–36.
51. See generally Kramer, supra note 27, at 640–50.
52. Id. at 649–54.
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Madison would present a more complete version of his theory to
the general public in the tenth essay of a series that would come
53
to be known as The Federalist.
The essay was first published in the New York Daily
Advertiser on November 22 of 1787, and, though it was reprinted
in two other New York papers—the New York Packet and the
Independent Journal—over the next two days, Madison’s
54
commentary did not enjoy wide circulation. Indeed, it appeared
in just four other papers, only one outside of New York, over the
55
course of the next year. And it is perhaps telling that, on the
same day that Federalist 10 was first published, another New
York paper prominently featured Cincinattus IV, the fourth in a
six part series of editorials directed against James Wilson’s
56
influential State House Yard Speech of October 6. As Bernard
Bailyn pointed out, it was Wilson’s Philadelphia speech more
than the Federalist that was “the most famous, to some the most
57
notorious, federalist statement of the time,” and Cincinattus
(likely Virginian Richard Henry Lee) was only one of several
58
commentators to author widely publicized responses. By
comparison, the Federalist essays garnered relatively little
attention—less than a third were originally published outside of
New York—and, of those that were, Madison’s tenth paper was
59
not among the most widely reprinted.
Even after ratification, when The Federalist, as a whole,
began to settle into constitutional argument fairly quickly,
Madison’s essay on the enlarged republic was not among those
that judges initially turned to for guidance on constitutional
60
questions. While several early Supreme Court justices
(including, notably, John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland)
lauded the papers as definitive accounts of constitutional

53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
54. 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 542 (John P. Kaminski, et. al eds., 2003) [hereinafter 19 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF RATIFICATION].
55. Id. The only out-of-state paper to reprint the essay was the Pennsylvania
Gazette, which published it on January 2, 1788.
56. Id. at 281.
57. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 328 (2d ed. 1992).
58. See 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 54, at 337–38
(CC: 134) (annotating publication of and response to Wilson’s speech).
59. Id. at 540–49 (annotating publications of each of the essays).
60. For a thorough review of the early Court’s use of The Federalist, see James G.
Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of The Federalist Papers, 1985
BYU L. REV. 65.
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61

meaning, Federalist 10 itself did not make its first appearance in
62
a federal appellate opinion until 1969, and it would not turn up
63
in a Supreme Court opinion until 1974. Nor, perhaps more
surprisingly, were early constitutional scholars particularly
th
drawn to Madison’s paper. Although many of the 19 century’s
64
most influential treatise writers—including William Rawle,
65
66
67
James Kent, Joseph Story, George Curtis, and Thomas
68
Cooley — referenced The Federalist repeatedly, only Story gave
69
any space or thought to Federalist 10. In exploring the
preamble’s appeal to the cause of “domestic tranquility,” Story
devoted three short sections (roughly a page and a half of his
nearly 780 page opus) to an almost verbatim transcription of
Madison’s thoughts on faction; although, in fact, he made no
70
attribution or citation to Federalist 10 itself. And the law
journals, though not nearly as prevalent or important as treatises
in the 19th century, tell a similar story: it appears that Federalist
10 did not make its first appearance in a scholarly article until
61. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819) (“No tribute can
be paid to [the Federalist’s authors] which exceeds their merit.”); see also Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. 386, 391 (1789) (deeming “the author of the Federalist” superior to both
Blackstone and Wooddeson); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810)
(Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he letters of Publius . . . are well known to
be entitled the highest respect”). At least some of The Federalist’s initial influence
probably arises from its relatively early publication: the first bound volumes came out in
1788, THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, IN TWO VOLUMES (J. & A. McLean eds., 1788), while Elliot’s Debates
did not come out until 1836, Madison’s notes were not published until 1840, Hamilton’s
Works did not appear until 1851, and Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention
only went to press in 1911. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 73.
62. Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing Federalist
10 for the proposition that “our forefathers had sufficient vision to ensure that even the
many must give way to certain fundamental rights of the few”).
63. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (citing Federalist 10 as evidence of the
Framers’ fear that “splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant
damage to the fabric of government”).
64. E.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 109 n.8 (1825) (opining that the essays “contain the soundest
principles of government, expressed in the most eloquent language”).
65. E.g., JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290 (1826)
(referencing “the high authority of the Federalist”).
66. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES v–vi (1833) (calling The Federalist “an incomparable commentary of three of the
greatest statesmen of their age”).
67. E.g., 1 GEORGE T. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 417 (1854) (ascribing to The
Federalist a “weight and power which commanded the careful attention of the country”).
68. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (1868) (making multiple references).
69. STORY, supra note 66, at 158–59.
70. Id.

!!!BARTRUM-271-CONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANONFINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:52 AM

26

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 27:9

71

1926. This, perhaps, helps to explain why Madison’s primary
antebellum biographers did not find the essay worthy of much
note or attention. Neither John Quincy Adams nor William
Rives devoted any significant discussion to the specific paper,
though Rives did recognize and applaud Madison’s innovative
72
theory of the enlarged republic. For the first century of
American life, then, Federalist 10 had virtually no place at all in
our ongoing arguments about constitutional meaning. That all
changed, however, in 1913 with the publication of Charles
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
73
United States.
Writing in the midst of Progressive battles with a
recalcitrant Court, Beard hoped to “bring back into the mental
picture of the Constitution those realistic features of economic
conflict, stress, and strain, which my masters had, for some
74
reason, left out of it.” Though certainly cognizant of the
ideological implications of his work, Beard denied any
underlying political motivations and claimed only a
straightforward sense of historical curiosity: “In [my] stud[ies] I
had occasion to read voluminous writings by the Fathers, and I
was struck by the emphasis which so many of them placed upon
economic interests as forces in politics and in the formulation of
75
laws and constitutions.” And, in the course of those readings,
his mind fastened particularly on Federalist 10 and Madison’s
76
thoughts on the Constitution’s tendency to control faction.
Indeed, in Madison’s long-forgotten essay, Beard found a
“masterly statement of the theory of economic determinism in

71. Forrest R. Black, The American Constitutional System: An Experiment in
Limited Government, 10 CONST. REV. 35, 37 (1926) (citing Federalist 10 for the
proposition that “the general opinion of the convention . . . [was that government should]
secure private rights against majority factions”). My conclusion regarding Federalist 10’s
absence from earlier articles is based on a search of the HeinOnLine law journal
database.
72. See JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON AND JAMES
MONROE 41 (1851) (referring to Hamilton’s Federalist 9 and Madison’s Federalist 10
together, as a “consideration of the utility of the Union as a safeguard against domestic
faction and insurrection”); WILLIAM C. RIVES, 2 LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON
488 (1866) (discussing Madison’s theory of the enlarged republic and mentioning that
Federalist 10 “exhibits a power of analysis, and a depth and clearness of abstract
reasoning, which have commanded the admiration of every intelligent reader”).
73. BEARD, supra note 26.
74. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES xx (Transaction Publishers 2003) (reprinting the introduction to
the 1935 edition).
75. Id. at xviii.
76. Id.
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77

politics.” In his argument, Federalist 10 spoke primarily to the
dangers of class struggle and was fundamental and compelling
evidence—the proverbial smoking gun—of the Framers’
devotion to propertied interests:
Different degrees and kinds of property inevitably exist in
modern society; party doctrines and “principles” originate in
the sentiments and views of which the possession of various
kinds of property creates in the minds of its possessors; class
and group divisions based on property lie at the basis of
modern government; and politics and constitutional law are
inevitably a reflex of these contending interests. Those who
are inclined to repudiate the hypothesis of economic
determinism as a European importation must, therefore,
revise their views, on learning that one of the earliest, and
certainly one of the clearest, statements of it came from a
profound student of politics who sat in the Convention that
78
framed our fundamental law.

Beard went on to present Madison’s essay as the paradigmatic
expression of the economic interests underlying the entire
79
constitutional endeavor.
As a historical study, Beard’s work generally suffers from
what David Hackett Fischer has labeled the “furtive fallacy”: the
conviction that secret—or at least undeclared—motives lurk
behind the decisions and events that populate the surface of the
80
historical record. Given his belief that the Framers rarely made
their economic motivations an explicit part of ratification
rhetoric, Beard seized on particular language in Federalist 10
identifying economic class as the “chief cause” of political
81
faction—the primary evil the Constitution aimed to suppress.
He quoted Madison selectively—though not entirely unfairly—
to this effect:
[T]he most common and most durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those
who hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors,
and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A
77.
78.
79.
80.

BEARD, supra note 26, at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 156-59.
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARDS A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT 76 (1970). We might also fairly accuse Beard of committing what
Fisher labeled the “fallacy of tunnel history,” the tendency to divide historical events into
simplified and self-contained causal strands. Id. at 142.
81. BEARD, supra note 26, at 156.
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landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests grow
up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
82
different classes actuated by different sentiments and views.

For Beard, Madison’s essay expressly revealed the Framers’
hope that an enlarged republic with a strong central government
would better allow wealthier, propertied Americans to divide
and conquer their economic inferiors. When in doubt, then, we
should understand the constitutional text and structure as
intended to protect wealth against coalesced class politics: “[The
remedy] lies in making it difficult for enough contending
interests to fuse into a majority, and in balancing one over
against another. The machinery for doing this is created by the
83
new Constitution and by the Union.” To Progressives, then,
Beard’s argument used Federalist 10 as a call to radically
restructure the Constitution.
The book was immediately controversial and inspired
vigorous criticism in high places. In the preface to his 1935
edition, Beard recalls his swift condemnation by “conservative
Republicans, including ex-President Taft” and a summons to
explain himself to the New York Bar Association, which he
84
declined. But he also had a devoted and influential following,
and among scholars no one carried the torch more eagerly than
Vernon Louis Parrington, whose three-volume Main Currents in
85
American Thought —which posited an enduring divide between
Hamiltonian elitists and Jeffersonian republicans at the center of
American political life—one scholar would later call the
86
“Summa Theologica of Progressive history.” Parrington likened
Beard’s work to “a discovery that struck home like a submarine
torpedo—the discovery that the drift toward plutocracy was not
a drift away from the spirit of the Constitution, but an inevitable
unfolding of its premises; . . . [the Constitution] was, in fact, a
carefully formulated expression of eighteenth century property
87
consciousness.” Like Beard, Parrington found the true nature
of these premises described in The Federalist’s “remarkable
tenth number, which compresses within a few pages pretty much

82. Id. at 156–57, (quoting FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
83. Id. at 158.
84. BEARD, supra note 74, at xx.
85. V.L. PARRINGTON, 1–3 MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927).
86. Charles Crowe, The Emergence of Progressive History, 27 J. HIST. IDEAS 109,
121 (1966).
87. 3 PARRINGTON, supra note 85, at 410.
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the whole Federalist theory of political science . . .” The effect
of Beard’s and Parrington’s argumentative usage of Madison,
combined with the growing movement towards Progressive
history, was to recover Federalist 10 from relative obscurity and
elevate it to a place among those canonical texts that must
89
inform our arguments about constitutional meaning. Indeed,
discussion of Madison’s theory of faction appeared in more than
90
a hundred scholarly articles between 1913 and 1950, as well as
91
in numerous Progressive histories, and in several notable
92
efforts to respond to Beard’s interpretation.
It was Beard’s use of Federalist 10 which both canonized the
essay and established its initial metonymic meaning in
constitutional discourse. As a symbol, Madison’s paper now
stood for the Framers’ intention to create a constitutional
structure that would protect private property from populist
redistribution efforts. And, as Garry Wills observed, even those
scholars who disagreed with the overall economic interpretation
of the Constitution seemed to concede that Beard had
interpreted Federalist 10 correctly: “[Neutral scholars] might not
agree with Beard’s politics; but they often felt he had got
93
Madison’s politics right.” As such, Federalist 10 emerged as a
powerful metonymic tool in at least two modalities of academic
94
constitutional argument. In structural argument, the essay stood
for the proposition that the constitutional architecture protects
wealth and the laissez-faire economy against potentially
tyrannous proletarian majorities. In historical argument,
Federalist 10 was symbolic of the Framers’ intention to craft a
Constitution that embodied these principles of economic
determinism. At this point, Federalist 10 did not make its way
88. 1 PARRINGTON, supra note 85, at 286.
89. See Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 48 (“[A]fter Beard’s book appeared the
Tenth Federalist became the essay most often quoted to explain the philosophy of the
founding fathers, and thus the ‘ultimate meaning’ of the United States Constitution
itself.”); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST xv (1981) (“Beard
first put Federalist 10 in the center of constitutional debate, where it has remained ever
since.”).
90. This conclusion is based on a search of JSTOR’s “history,” “law,” “philosophy,”
and “political science” databases, as well as HeinOnLine’s law journal database.
91. See Crowe, supra note 86, at 123–25 (surveying Progressive scholars).
92. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 106–11 (surveying responses to Beard, most
notably those by Charles Warren, Walter Crosskey, Robert Brown, and Forrest
McDonald).
93. WILLS, supra note 89, at xx.
94. I explore only the structural and historical modalities here, but there is certainly
an argument that Federalist 10 so understood was also symbolic of the American free
market ethos.
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from the academy into the courtroom—indeed, given the
metonymic meanings Beard attached to the essay, it is difficult
to imagine a circumstance in which it would have come up at the
bar—but it did take up a prominent position in the canon of
academic argument, where it remained influential and largely
undisturbed until Douglass Adair began to reexamine The
Federalist in the 1940s and early 1950s.
Adair, who staunchly opposed Beard’s ideas about
95
economic determinism, began by writing a series of articles in
the William & Mary Quarterly exploring the historical
controversy over the authorship of certain essays in The
96
Federalist. In 1951, however, he focused his attention squarely
on Federalist 10 in an effort to recapture a more nuanced (and
perhaps more sophisticated) understanding of Madison’s
97
argument. It is instructive that, writing nearly forty years later,
Adair could claim (on well-researched grounds) that Beard’s
interpretation “still governs to a remarkable degree the
contemporary view of Federalist 10, Madison, and the
98
Constitution.” Adair then waded straight into battle with that
interpretation, however, which he characterized as the view
“that Madison’s Federalist theory expounded the doctrine that
99
theories are unimportant in politics.” In other words, according
to Adair, Beard saw Federalist 10 as compelling evidence that
“political theory played [no] consequential role in creating the
Constitution; speculation there was in plenty in the Convention,
but it was land and debt speculation, not speculative
100
thought” —and, in this way, the Framers had forsaken the
101
Enlightened democratic principles of 1776.
Adair’s response—which took him another six years to fully
formulate—was to recover and present much of the historical
context described above: Madison’s extensive and troubled study
of ancient democracies, his reliance on David Hume’s work in
95. Adair’s doctoral dissertation, which remained unpublished—though widely
read—for many years, is entitled The Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, and,
as such, was a direct reply to Beard’s work entitled The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian
Democracy. Compare ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS, supra note 27, with BEARD,
supra note 26.
96. Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers: Part 1, 1
WM. & MARY Q. 97 (1944); Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist
Papers: Part II, 1 WM. & MARY Q. 235 (1944).
97. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 48.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 49.
100. Id. at 62.
101. See id. at 48 n.1.
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political theory, and the sudden revelation of the enlarged
102
republic. Adair argued that, “by tracing the development of
Madison’s theory as he thought it out in the spring of 1787,” he
could demonstrate two points conclusively: (1) the Virginian
never subscribed to the “naïve doctrine” regarding the
irrelevance of political theory that Beard had suggested; and (2)
Madison’s ideas, “as abstract speculative thought played a
significant role in the writing and ratification of the United
103
States Constitution.” In particular, Adair pointed to the
discovery of Hume—whose work “must have electrified
Madison as he read [it]”—as evidence that a great deal of
considered political theory lay behind the ideas expressed in
104
Federalist 10. Further, Madison never suggested that the
dominant economic faction would inevitably control
government: indeed, the same checks that hinder other factions
would seem to operate with equal force upon propertied
105
interests. Adair thus used Federalist 10 to make his initial
argument that Madison had far loftier considerations than
personal realty and the suppression of class struggle in mind in
1789. But, perhaps owing to his untimely death in 1968, Adair
never seems to have completed his second argument about the
impact of Madison’s theory on the Constitution’s framing and
ratification, leaving that discussion to “a later issue” of the
William & Mary Quarterly, which (to my knowledge) never
106
appeared. But, regardless of this failing, Adair’s work in the
1950s went a long way toward rehabilitating Madison’s essay as a
richer and more complex symbol of constitutional meaning.
Indeed, between 1951 and 1990, Adair’s work on Federalist
10 was cited in more than a hundred scholarly articles, and his
interpretation of Madison’s theory appeared in numerous books
107
on history and law. Notable examples include Garry Wills’s
Explaining America: The Federalist—the dedication of which is
108
“To the memory of Douglass Adair, who saw it first” —and
Martin Diamond’s essays Democracy and The Federalist: A

102. For much of this discussion, see Adair’s follow-up piece on Federalist 10. Adair,
supra note 37.
103. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 49–50.
104. Adair, Politics, supra note 37, at 351.
105. Id.
106. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 67.
107. This conclusion is based on a search of JSTOR’s, Hein-On-Line’s, and
Westlaw’s databases for the relevant period.
108. WILLS, supra note 89.
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109

Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent and Ethics and Politics:
110
The American Way. And, from the ripples Adair stirred,
Gordon Wood would fashion a crashing wave in his 1969 opus,
111
The Creation of the American Republic. Wood’s thoroughly
researched account of the diverse intellectual spirits that guided
the Founders in the time between independence and ratification
presented a theory of Federalist 10—deeply indebted to
112
Adair —rooted in a complex and sophisticated understanding
113
of historical and contemporary political philosophy. Wood’s
book, as a whole, was profoundly influential and would
eventually bring about the end of Beard’s theoretical hold on
114
constitutional historiography. Further, his Adairian usage of
Federalist 10 helped to embed the “democratic theory” account
of the enlarged republic more firmly in the canonical riverbank.
Thirty years later, Jack Rakove would take up Adair’s
stated, but unsupported, second thesis by using Federalist 10 to
argue that Madison’s theory of the enlarged republic was
115
broadly influential at the time of the founding. According to
Rakove, the theory was central to Madison’s arguments in favor
of proportional representation, and was a decisive factor in the
116
Convention’s decision to vote down the New Jersey Plan. The
thought (which, concededly, did not carry the day) was that a
larger democratic electorate—stripped of jurisdictional
malapportionments—would provide the best protection for
important minority rights. That Madison, with his considerable
wisdom and influence, thus viewed proportional representation
as “the groundwork” upon which the constitutional framework
would rest was persuasive evidence that the theory of the
enlarged republic was central to the Framers’ understanding of
117
the Constitution. But, even before Rakove fleshed out this
final argument, a refined, Adairian version of the Federalist 10
109. Martin Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the
Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52 (1959.
110. Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (R. Horowitz ed., 1986).
111. WOOD, supra note 28.
112. See id. at 505 n.51 (citing Adair’s work and noting that “[m]uch of the recent
interest in Madison has been stimulated or anticipated by the work of Douglass Adair”).
113. Id. at 504–05.
114. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 349 n.19 (1991)
(“Just as Beard’s Economic Interpretation controlled the historical vision of the first half
of the century, Wood’s Creation has dominated the last generation.”).
115. Jack N. Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of
Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424, 434–44 (1987).
116. See id. at 434, 442.
117. Id. at 429.
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metonym settled into place: as a structural symbol, Federalist 10
stood for the idea that the architecture of an enlarged
confederation works to protect important minority rights from
an overbearing majority; and, as a historical symbol, the essay
suggests that the Framers’ designed the federal government with
118
this theory of large-scale democracy squarely in mind. But,
while this remains perhaps the predominant shape of the
metonym as it is used in constitutional discourse today, in just
the last decade, Larry Kramer began to chip away at the
historical aspects of Federalist 10’s metonymic meaning.
In a 1999 article entitled Madison’s Audience, Kramer
questioned the influence that the theory of the enlarged republic
exerted at the Constitutional Convention, or during the
119
ratification debates. On the first count, Kramer argued that it
is unclear whether any member of the Convention (besides
Hamilton) had any real idea what Madison was talking about
120
when he presented his thoughts on faction. Other than his own
notes and a brief acknowledgement by Hamilton, none of the
other surviving accounts indicate any comprehension of
Madison’s theory as he presented it on June 6th, or later on June
121
18th. Nor is there evidence that any delegate rose to support or
122
object to the speech. Moreover, Kramer pointed out that the
one structural mechanism Madison felt his theory most
demanded—the federal veto over all state laws—failed to make
123
From the
its way into the Constitution, as drafted.
contemporaneous record, then, it appeared to Kramer that
Madison’s thoughts on faction had little influence on his fellow
Framers. As to the ratification debates, the evidence seems to
suggest that Federalist 10 itself had relatively little impact on
public opinion. Kramer notes that, in general, “the Federalist
Paper’s circulation was far too small to influence the debate,”
and, even though two other commentators published similar
thoughts, “theirs were isolated voices, and neither writer
achieved widespread recognition or significant influence in the
124
ensuing debate.” In fact, far more probative to Kramer was the
general silence regarding Madison’s revelation: “[I]n all the
118. For another take on Federalist 10’s evolution through this period of scholarship,
see ACKERMAN, supra note 114, at 221–29.
119. Kramer, supra note 27.
120. Id. at 637–48.
121. Id. at 645 n.141, 646.
122. Id. at 642.
123. Id. at 649–53.
124. Id. at 665, 666.
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torrent of pamphlets and essays and articles that streamed from
the presses—enough to fill many volumes—there are only the
Federalist Papers and these two other essayists to suggest that
Madison’s theory of the extended republic was part of the
125
debate at all.” In Kramer’s view, then, Federalist 10 may have
continuing value in structural argument, but its place in the
historical canon is, at best, tenuous.
In just the eleven years since its publication, Kramer’s
article has made an appearance in nearly one hundred articles
126
and almost as many books, including such notable works as
127
Akhil Reed Amar’s America’s Constitution: A Biography, and
128
Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People. Thus, we see that the
processes of canonical evolution are constantly in motion. Once
canonized, a text becomes a powerful argumentative tool, which
we then struggle to harness to our particular causes. Indeed,
precisely because a canonical text gives such profound guidance
to the flow or shape of legitimate constitutional argument, the
skilled practitioner must always account for the text’s impact on
her arguments—even when she may not be able to marshal the
metonym in her favor. It is this constant practice of distinction
and analogy that I termed canonical refinement, and I hope that
Federalist 10’s history in academic argument well illustrates the
phenomenon. The essay, which lingered in obscurity for over a
century, entered the canon with Beard’s 1913 historiographical
bombshell, where it was used to symbolize a founding
commitment to the protection of private property; this
metonymic meaning remained largely in place for the next forty
years, until Douglass Adair revisited the essay and used it to
illustrate Madison’s commitment to democratic theory; and, in
just the last decade, we have seen Larry Kramer refine the
metonym even further. But, while I contend that the academic
sphere of constitutional argument stands on its own and is every
bit as significant and important as the advocative and judicial
spheres, in the context of this particular Essay, I would be remiss
if I did not make some attempt to account for the impact that
these academic refinements have had on decisions rendered by
the Supreme Court.
125. Id. at 667.
126. This conclusion is based on a search of databases on Westlaw and JSTOR.
127. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 43 n.95
(2006).
128. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 404 n.9 (2009).
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It should come as no surprise that Federalist 10 did not
appear in any Supreme Court opinion written before 1913; as I
argued above, the essay had virtually no place in constitutional
argument—much less in the canon—before Charles Beard
dusted it off for his economic interpretation. And, on a
moment’s reflection, it is relatively easy to understand why the
metonym—as Beard canonized it—still did not appear in the
Court’s opinions over the next half century. In Beard’s usage,
Federalist 10 symbolized the Framers’ betrayal of the basic
American ideals announced in 1776, and was thus a call for
constitutional reformation. In short, while Beard’s argument
provided grist for the academic mill, his was not the kind of
symbolic meaning the Court was likely to employ. But after
Adair’s refinements—which refashioned the text as symbolic of
a profound and innovative American democratic theory—began
to take hold, we do see the courts begin to take up and use
129
Madison’s essay in argument. In fact, it was for just these
Adairian meanings that the 8th Circuit first invoked Federalist 10
in 1969. Faced with a challenge to racially segregated schools in
Arkansas, the Court cited Madison’s essay as compelling
evidence that “‘equal protection’ [does not] depend upon the
majority vote . . . our forefathers had sufficient vision to ensure
that even the many must give way to certain fundamental rights
of the few” in interpreting the text of the Fourteenth
130
Amendment. Just five years later, the Supreme Court itself
would call Federalist 10 into argumentative service in deciding
whether a California law that required independent candidates
for political office to disavow party affiliation for a year before
131
an election ran afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In interpreting the scope of the constitutional language, the
Court used Adair’s version of Federalist 10 to argue that
“splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do
significant damage to the fabric of government,” of which
132
concern justified the state’s regulation of political candidates.
Since 1969, Federalist 10 appeared in fifty-six lower federal
court cases and in sixteen Supreme Court opinions, including
some of the most notable and important decisions handed down

129. For an excellent overview of these cases, see J. Christopher Jennings, Madison’s
New Audience: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Federalist Visited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 817
(2002).
130. Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1969).
131. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728–29 (1974).
132. Id. at 736.
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133

over that time. Half of the Supreme Court citations came in
opinions addressing election law, ballot access, or political
speech questions, where the essay has been used metonymically
to suggest that the “Madisonian democratic tradition” is at least
“partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue
their individual good through the political process, and that the
summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective
134
But Federalist 10 also appeared in opinions
welfare.”
135
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise
136
137
Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Republican Guaranty
138
Clause. And, right on cue, Federalist 10 made an appearance in
the most publicized and controversial opinion the Court
rendered this term—Citizens United v. Federal Election
139
Commission —as Justice Kennedy used it in his argument for
overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s
140
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause. In each of these
contexts, the argumentative use roughly corresponds to the
metonymic meanings—both structural and historical—that
Adair began to recover and refine in 1951, which suggests that
the meanings attached to Federalist 10 within the academic
sphere gave real shape to the conventional context within which
the courts must interpret constitutional text. But, of course, the
Court’s usage will, itself, refine the essay’s meaning in our
argument over time. As with Wittgenstein’s river of uncertainty,
then, the canon shapes the practice, but the practice, in turn,
reshapes the canon. And all of this is evidence that—at least in
the majority of controversial cases—bridging the gap between
constitutional text and constitutional meaning is best understood
as a perpetual and complex feedback loop between
interpretation and construction, rather than the straightforward
linear process the distinction, as posited, seems to imply.

133. Notable cases include City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523
(1989); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010).
134. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 56 & n.7. (1982).
135. Croson, 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515
U.S. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
137. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984).
139. 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010).
140. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 692 (1990). Indeed, Justice
Kennedy makes almost the same use of Federalist 10 as he did in his dissent in Austin. Id.
at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Within our current practice, constitutional meaning often
arises from argument and argumentative conventions, not from
linguistic facts contained or described in the text. And the more
we argue, the more our argument affects and alters the
conventional context that makes this meaning possible. While I
analogized this process to Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a river and
its banks, it is also something like the observer effect described
in Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty principle: the ways that we
use canonical texts will change those texts’ meaning over time,
and these changes will ultimately partially redefine the
boundaries of reasonable interpretation. Because I view
meaning in these terms, and not in the Gricean terms that seem
to underlie the interpretation-construction distinction, I am led
to doubt the distinction’s utility as part of a larger normative
theory of constitutional adjudication. Rather than separating an
initial analytic kind of inquiry (discovering linguistic facts that
make up semantic content) from a subsequent synthetic activity
(fashioning legal rules consistent with that content), I contend
that, at most, the distinction describes two different synthetic
processes. The first process finds us making assertions (within
the appropriate modal forms) about the intentions or principles
underlying constitutional text; the second process asks us to
make modal arguments about the legal rules that should follow
from these intentions.
Understood this way, the line between interpretation and
construction threatens to get very blurry indeed, and I suggest
that it might be more helpful to understand the distinction as
simply delineating different modalities of constitutional
argument. Interpretation might correspond roughly to assertions
made in the historical, textual, and structural modalities, while
construction might match up with the doctrinal, prudential, and
ethical modalities—and, in difficult cases, we will likely need to
employ modalities on both sides of the divide. The advantage of
viewing the problem this way is that it allows us to understand
constitutional meaning as a product of the accepted conventions
of argument, rather than as if it were a hidden treasure we could
uncover if we had the right map. This, in turn, allows us to turn
away from map-making and, instead, ask what I think are the
right kinds of questions for constitutional scholarship: How do
our arguments affect the constitutional grammar over time?
What processes or techniques have historically brought about
changes in our argumentative conventions and, thus,
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constitutional meaning? These questions are best answered by
description, and my hope is that such descriptions will help
future practitioners understand the kinds of creative argument
that changed the game in the past. One powerful technique of
this kind involves efforts to refine the metonymic meaning of the
canonical texts we use in our modal arguments, and this is the
process I described relating to Federalist 10.
I chose to examine Federalist 10 in this piece for two
reasons. First, it is evidence of the impact the academy can have
on the constitutional conversation. Second, because the essay is
most often used in the historical and structural modalities, its
metonymic evolution illustrates the effect that constructive
processes can have on the forms of argument that we might
associate with interpretation. This, I suggest, helps to
demonstrate that our efforts to discover “semantic content”
often depend on constructed conventions and meanings. Other
illustrations might be more dramatic—compare, for example,
Brown v. Board of Education’s metonymic meaning in 1970 with
the symbolic Brown that featured prominently in the most
141
recent affirmative action opinions —but Brown seems more at
home in the ethical modality, which better corresponds to the
construction side of the distinction. As such, it does not seem to
illustrate the constructed elements of the interpretive process
quite as well. I can only hope that the story of Federalist 10 was
both illustrative and instructive in this regard. And, in the end, I
hope that it helped to make my larger point that it is the
practice—not facts about the text, or any particular theory—that
ultimately gives rise to constitutional meanings.

141. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
747–48 (2007) (“Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again.”).

